Transfers to Sustain Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control

Posted: 1 Jan 1999

See all articles by M. Germain

M. Germain

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Philippe Toint

Facult├ęs Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix (FUNDP)

Henry Tulkens

Catholic University of Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Aart de Zeeuw

Tilburg University - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 1998

Abstract

International environmental agreements aiming at correcting negative externalities generated by transboundary pollution are difficult to achieve for many reasons. Important obstacles arise from asymmetry in costs and benefits, and instability may occur due to the fact that coalitions of countries may attempt to do better for themselves outside of any proposed agreement. In a static context it has already been shown that it is possible to achieve stability in the sense of the core of a co-operative game, by means of appropriately defined transfers between the countries involved. However, the transboundary pollution problems that are most important are caused by accumulated pollutants so that a dynamic analysis is required. This paper provides a transfer scheme that yields a core property in a dynamic context. The possibility of computing such transfers numerically is discussed.

JEL Classification: C73, D62, F42, H4, Q3

Suggested Citation

Germain, M. and Toint, Philippe and Tulkens, Henry and de Zeeuw, Aart J., Transfers to Sustain Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control (September 1998). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=141999

M. Germain

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Belgium

Philippe Toint

Facult├ęs Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix (FUNDP) ( email )

Rempart de la Vierge 8
B-5000 Namur
Belgium
081 724917 (Phone)
081 724914 (Fax)

Henry Tulkens (Contact Author)

Catholic University of Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Belgium
+32 10 47 43 21 (Phone)
+32 10 47 43 01 (Fax)

Aart J. De Zeeuw

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2065 (Phone)
+31-13-466-3042 (Fax)

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