The 'Wall Street Walk' and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice

Posted: 22 Jun 2009  

Anat R. Admati

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Paul C. Pfleiderer

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2009

Abstract

We examine whether a large shareholder can alleviate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders through the credible threat of exit on the basis of private information. In our model, the threat of exit often reduces agency costs, but additional private information need not enhance the effectiveness of the mechanism. Moreover, the threat of exit can produce quite different effects depending on whether the agency problem involves desirable or undesirable actions from shareholders' perspective. Our results are consistent with empirical findings on the interaction between managers and minority large shareholders and have further empirical implications.

Keywords: D53, D82, G10, G30, G34

Suggested Citation

Admati, Anat R. and Pfleiderer, Paul C., The 'Wall Street Walk' and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice (July 2009). The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 7, pp. 2445-2485, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1422416 or http://dx.doi.org/hhp037

Anat R. Admati (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-4987 (Phone)
650-725-6152 (Fax)

Paul C. Pfleiderer

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-4495 (Phone)
650-725-7979 (Fax)

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
536