Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Soft Money and Hard Choices: Why Political Parties Might Legislate Against Soft Money Donations

35 Pages Posted: 22 Jun 2009  

David Gill

Purdue University, Department of Economics

Date Written: June 19, 2009

Abstract

In contrast to the bulk of the campaign finance literature that highlights political action committee (PAC) contributions and single donations, this paper emphasizes soft money and the rationale for dual contributions. Employing a formal model of unregulated contributions and political access, we show that donors will rationally choose to contribute to both political parties. While the parties accept these dual contributions, they lead to an imbalance between the benefits of contributions and the costs of providing access. This race to acquire unlimited soft money leads to a situation where the parties agree to campaign finance reform legislation.

Keywords: campaign finance, campaign finance reform, campaign funding, political funding, party funding, party finance, donations, political donations, access, political access, dual contributions, politcal action committee, soft money, campaign finance legislation

Suggested Citation

Gill, David, Soft Money and Hard Choices: Why Political Parties Might Legislate Against Soft Money Donations (June 19, 2009). Public Choice, Vol. 123, Nos. 3-4, pp. 411-438, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1422616

David Gill (Contact Author)

Purdue University, Department of Economics ( email )

610 Purdue Mall
West Lafayette, IN 47907
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
370
Rank
67,742
Abstract Views
8,022