Capital Market Frictions and Deposit Constraints on Banks

FRB New York Research Paper No. 9731

Posted: 8 Jan 1999

Date Written: October 1997

Abstract

Following the investment-cash flow literature, we test whether bank lending is constrained by the availability of insured deposits--a necessary condition for the existence of a bank lending channel of monetary policy. We treat insured deposits as a type of "internal fund," similar to cash flows. We use a simple model to sort out the possible identification issues in interpreting the correlation between lending and deposit growth, including reverse causality and omitted variable bias. To minimize the latter, we split the sample of banks by leverage and also use deposit flows at sister banks within a holding company as an "instrument." The results are consistent with the existence of frictions in capital market facing banks, and that such frictions force bank lending to be constrained by the availability of insured deposits. However, the frictions seem to matter only at small banks, suggesting that the bank lending channel of monetary policy is small.

JEL Classification: G21, G23, E21

Suggested Citation

Morgan, Donald P., Capital Market Frictions and Deposit Constraints on Banks (October 1997). FRB New York Research Paper No. 9731. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=142300

Donald P. Morgan (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
Research Department
New York, NY 10045
United States
212-720-6573 (Phone)

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