A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation

Posted: 19 Jan 1999

See all articles by Thomas F. Cooley

Thomas F. Cooley

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jorge Soares

University of Delaware

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

We construct a general equilibrium model in which a pay-as-you-go social security system can be adopted and sustained as a political and economic equilibrium. We analyze the welfare implications of this system and compare general equilibrium welfare measures to the commonly used notion of actuarial fairness.

JEL Classification: H55

Suggested Citation

Cooley, Thomas F. and Soares, Jorge, A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 1, February 1999. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=142466

Thomas F. Cooley (Contact Author)

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

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Jorge Soares

University of Delaware ( email )

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