A Tale of Two Joint Ventures: Jiangsu, China and Havana, Cuba: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Public-Private Contracts in the Water Sector

Journal of Applied Economy, Symposium Issue on 'Critical Regulation,' vol. 3 (2009), pp. 39-56

14 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2009 Last revised: 5 Dec 2014

See all articles by F. E. Guerra-Pujol

F. E. Guerra-Pujol

University of Central Florida; Pontifical Catholic University of Puerto Rico

Date Written: April 19, 2009

Abstract

Although there are few applications of game theory in the water governance literature, in this paper the author applies a game-theoretic framework to public-private partnerships in the water industry, with “water industry” defined broadly to include fresh water supply, wastewater treatment, and sanitation and sewarage services. In summary, the paper (1) provides a general overview of the most common forms of contractual arrangements or public-private partnerships in the water sector, (2) reviews two recent examples of public-private partnerships in the water sector -- one in the municipality of Havana, Cuba, the other in the Jiangsu province of China, and (3) presents a generalized partnership-game model and explains the possible application of this game-theoretic model to public-private partnerships in the water sector.

Keywords: best response, internal-externality, public-private partnership

JEL Classification: C7, H4, K12

Suggested Citation

Guerra-Pujol, F. E., A Tale of Two Joint Ventures: Jiangsu, China and Havana, Cuba: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Public-Private Contracts in the Water Sector (April 19, 2009). Journal of Applied Economy, Symposium Issue on 'Critical Regulation,' vol. 3 (2009), pp. 39-56. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1425303 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1425303

F. E. Guerra-Pujol (Contact Author)

University of Central Florida ( email )

Orlando, FL 32816
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.priorprobability.com

Pontifical Catholic University of Puerto Rico ( email )

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
276
Abstract Views
1,115
rank
111,354
PlumX Metrics