Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis

Dreher, Axel; Fischer, Justina  A. V.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1426746

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Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis

IZA Discussion Paper No. 4259

42 Pages Posted: 30 Jun 2009

See all articles by Axel Dreher

Justina A. V. Fischer

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD); Stockholm School of Economics; University of Hohenheim

There are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of transnational terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact. These results are robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.

Keywords: terrorism, decentralization, federalism, governance quality, government effectiveness

JEL Classification: D74, H70, H40

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Dreher, Axel and Fischer, Justina A.V., Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4259, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1426746 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1426746