Is a Federal European Constitution for an Enlarged European Union Necessary? Some Preliminary Suggestions Using Public Choice Analysis

CEGE Discussion Paper No. 83

29 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2009 Last revised: 10 Jul 2009

See all articles by Friedrich Schneider

Friedrich Schneider

Johannes Kepler University Linz - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Date Written: May 8, 2009

Abstract

In order to guarantee a further successful functioning of the enlarged European Union, a Federal European Constitution is proposed. Six basic elements of a future European federal constitution are developed: the European commission should be turned into a European government and the European legislation should consist of a two chamber system with full responsibility over all federal items. Three further key elements are the subsidiarity principle, federalism and the secession right, which are best suited to limiting the domain of the central European authority to which certain tasks are given, such as defense, foreign and environmental policy. Another important feature is direct democracy, which provides the possibility for European voters to participate actively in the political decision making, to break political and interest group cartels, and to prevent an unwanted shifting of responsibilities from EU member states to the European federal level.

JEL Classification: D72, D78, H7, H11

Suggested Citation

Schneider, Friedrich G., Is a Federal European Constitution for an Enlarged European Union Necessary? Some Preliminary Suggestions Using Public Choice Analysis (May 8, 2009). CEGE Discussion Paper No. 83, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1427759 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1427759

Friedrich G. Schneider (Contact Author)

Johannes Kepler University Linz - Department of Economics ( email )

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

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Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

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