The Efficiency of Comparative Causation

25 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2009

See all articles by Francesco Parisi

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Ram Singh

Delhi School of Economics - University of Delhi

Date Written: July 1, 2009


Comparative causation is the only tort regime that allows parties to share an accident loss in equilibrium. The sharing of an accident loss between a nonnegligent injurer and his nonnegligent victim spreads activity level and R&D incentives between prospective tortfeasors and their victims. This is an effect that is never observed under the other negligence and strict liability based regimes. In spite of these interesting attributes, the existing literature left open the question as to whether loss sharing was able to maintain optimal care incentives for both parties. In this paper, we address this unresolved issue in the literature, considering the effciency of loss-sharing under comparative causation.

Keywords: torts, loss-sharing, negligence, strict liability, comparative causation

JEL Classification: K13, K32

Suggested Citation

Parisi, Francesco and Singh, Ram, The Efficiency of Comparative Causation (July 1, 2009). Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-28, Available at SSRN: or

Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100

Ram Singh

Delhi School of Economics - University of Delhi ( email )

Delhi School of Economics
University of Delhi, North Campus
Delhi, Delhi 110007


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