An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games

36 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2009

See all articles by Subhasish M. Chowdhury

Subhasish M. Chowdhury

Department of Economics, University of Sheffield

Dan Kovenock

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2009

Abstract

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a “guerilla warfare” strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a “stochastic complete coverage” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields.

Keywords: Colonel Blotto, conflict resolution, contest theory, multi-dimensional resource allocation, rent-seeking, experiments

JEL Classification: C72, C91, D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Chowdhury, Subhasish M. and Kovenock, Daniel and Sheremeta, Roman M., An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games (June 2009). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2688, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1430284 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1430284

Subhasish M. Chowdhury

Department of Economics, University of Sheffield

Mappin Street
Sheffield, S1 4DT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/subhasishmc/

Daniel Kovenock (Contact Author)

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

1 University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

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