Elections and Deceptions: An Experimental Study on the Behavioral Effects of Democracy

IEW Working Paper No. 421

31 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2009 Last revised: 21 Aug 2013

See all articles by Luca Corazzini

Luca Corazzini

University of Padua - Department of Economics; Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Sebastian Kube

University of Bonn; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Michel André Maréchal

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Antonio Nicolò

University of Padua - Department of Economics; University of Manchester

Date Written: August 2013

Abstract

Traditionally, the virtue of democratic elections has been seen in their role as means of screening and sanctioning shirking public officials. This paper proposes a novel rationale for elections and political campaigns considering that candidates incur psychological costs of lying, in particular from breaking campaign promises. These non-pecuniary costs imply that campaigns influence subsequent behavior, even in the absence of reputational or image concerns. Our lab experiments reveal that promises are more than cheap talk. They influence the behavior of both voters and their representatives. We observe that the electorate is better off when their leaders are elected democratically rather than being appointed exogenously - but only in the presence of electoral campaigns. In addition, we find that representatives are more likely to serve the public interest when their approval rates are high. Altogether, our results suggest that elections and campaigns confer important benefits beyond their screening and sanctioning functions.

Keywords: Costs of Lying, Electoral Competition, Laboratory Experiment

JEL Classification: D72, C92, D03

Suggested Citation

Corazzini, Luca and Kube, Sebastian and Kube, Sebastian and Maréchal, Michel André and Nicolò, Antonio, Elections and Deceptions: An Experimental Study on the Behavioral Effects of Democracy (August 2013). IEW Working Paper No. 421, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1430904 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1430904

Luca Corazzini (Contact Author)

University of Padua - Department of Economics ( email )

via Del Santo 33
Padova, 35123
Italy

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Sebastian Kube

University of Bonn

BWL 1
Adenauerallee 24-42
Bonn, D-53012
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Michel André Maréchal

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland

Antonio Nicolò

University of Padua - Department of Economics ( email )

via Del Santo 33
Padova, 35123
Italy

University of Manchester ( email )

Arthur Lewis Building
Oxford Road
Manchester, M13 9PL
United Kingdom

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