Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Fines Against Hard Core Cartels in Europe: The Myth of Over Enforcement

Cahiers de Recherche PRISM-Sorbonne Working Paper

38 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2009 Last revised: 2 Sep 2009

Emmanuel Combe

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Constance Monnier

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Date Written: June 8, 2009

Abstract

Based on a sample of 64 cartels convicted by the European Commission from 1975 to 2009 and a methodology allowing to estimate restitution and dissuasive fines to be imposed on cartels from microeconomic variables on a case by case basis, this paper compares the level of fines actually inflicted to cartels participants to the illicit gain captured by the firms and estimates a range of restitution and dissuasive fines in each case. Our results show that fines imposed against cartels by the European Commission are overall sub optimal, whatever the level of the probability of detection.

Keywords: Cartels, Antitrust, Competition policy, European Commission

JEL Classification: L40, L41, K21

Suggested Citation

Combe, Emmanuel and Monnier, Constance, Fines Against Hard Core Cartels in Europe: The Myth of Over Enforcement (June 8, 2009). Cahiers de Recherche PRISM-Sorbonne Working Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1431644 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1431644

Emmanuel Combe

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

17, rue de la Sorbonne
Paris, IL 75005
France

Constance Monnier (Contact Author)

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

17, rue de la Sorbonne
Paris, IL 75005
France

Paper statistics

Downloads
915
Rank
20,049
Abstract Views
3,000