Efficiency of Share-Voting Systems: Report on Italy

188 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2009 Last revised: 18 Feb 2011

See all articles by B. Espen Eckbo

B. Espen Eckbo

Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Giulia Paone

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business

Runa Urheim

Central Bank of Norway

Date Written: January 2011

Abstract

Institutional shareholders around the world increasingly use active share-voting to protect their portfolio investments and improve corporate governance. However, exercising voting rights involves costly and often arcane country-specific legal rules. This report is one of a series examining the potential for increased harmonization of cross-border share-voting systems and proxy voting in the U.S. and Member States of the European Union (EU). The report describes the share-registration system and voting chain for publicly traded companies in Italy. We highlight voting impediments and examine recent regulatory attempt to make the voting process both more efficient and conforming to the 2007 EU Shareholder Rights Directive. We also provide some first empirical evidence on how Italian listed firms adapt to Italy's share-voting system in practice.

Keywords: voting, voting chain, shareownership, shareholder rights, proxy voting, voting impediments

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

Eckbo, B. Espen and Paone, Giulia and Urheim, Runa, Efficiency of Share-Voting Systems: Report on Italy (January 2011). Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2009-64; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 174/2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1431733 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1431733

B. Espen Eckbo (Contact Author)

Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-3953 (Phone)
603-646-3805 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu/eckbo

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Giulia Paone

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States

Runa Urheim

Central Bank of Norway ( email )

P.O. Box 1179
Oslo, N-0107
Norway

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