Small Circle, Entrenched Interest: The Electoral Anomalies of Hong Kong Deputies to the National People’s Congress

Hong Kong Law Journal, Vol. 37, p. 579, 2007

Posted: 11 Jul 2009

See all articles by D. W. Choy

D. W. Choy

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Fu Hualing

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law

Date Written: July 9, 2009

Abstract

Theoretically, Hong Kong deputies to the National People’s Congress (NPC) represent the interests of Hong Kong people in China’s highest organ of state power. The Central Authorities, through the Standing Committee of the NPC, exert a tight control over the electoral process in Hong Kong by making electoral rules, limiting the scope of eligible voters, and by utilising other formal and informal control mechanisms. Yet, a degree of autonomy in the electoral process produces results different from those expected by the Central Authorities. This article argues that the 'small circle' election creates opportunities and incentives for developing special interests. Gradually, these special interests become entrenched and develop a life of their own.

Suggested Citation

Choy, D. W. and Hualing, Fu, Small Circle, Entrenched Interest: The Electoral Anomalies of Hong Kong Deputies to the National People’s Congress (July 9, 2009). Hong Kong Law Journal, Vol. 37, p. 579, 2007 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1431913

D. W. Choy (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Fu Hualing

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong, Hong Kong
China

HOME PAGE: http://hub.hku.hk/rp/rp01245

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