Purchase - $38.00

Market Size and Intellectual Property Protection

27 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2009  

Michele Boldrin

Washington University in St. Louis

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Abstract

Intellectual property (IP) protection involves a trade-off between the undesirability of monopoly and the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation. Optimal policy depends on the relative strength of these two forces. We give a quantitative assessment of current IP policies. We focus particularly on the scale of the market, showing that as it increases, due either to growth or to the expansion of trade, IP protection should be reduced.

Suggested Citation

Boldrin, Michele and Levine, David K., Market Size and Intellectual Property Protection. International Economic Review, Vol. 50, Issue 3, pp. 855-881, August 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1432245 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00551.x

Michele Boldrin

Washington University in St. Louis ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Saint Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.dklevine.com

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Paper statistics

Downloads
3
Abstract Views
1,361