Saving Dolphins: Boycotts, Trade Sanctions, and Unobservable Technology

20 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2009

See all articles by Kaz Miyagiwa

Kaz Miyagiwa

Emory University - Department of Economics; Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER); Florida International University (FIU) - Department of Economics

Abstract

Consumers boycott some goods because they do not approve the ways they are manufactured. I examine the efficacy of boycotts and the role of trade policy in influencing the foreign exporter's technology choice. Even when its technology choice is unobservable, boycott threats can prompt the foreign firm to adopt the technology consumers prefer. Import policy can augment this effect, but when boycotts can have a substantial impact on demand, a use of ad valorem tariffs yields the unintended result. Specific tariffs and quotas are free of this defect, but specific tariffs are more effective than quotas in addressing consumers' concern.

Suggested Citation

Miyagiwa, Kaz, Saving Dolphins: Boycotts, Trade Sanctions, and Unobservable Technology. International Economic Review, Vol. 50, Issue 3, pp. 883-902, August 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1432246 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00552.x

Kaz Miyagiwa (Contact Author)

Emory University - Department of Economics ( email )

1602 Fishburne Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki Osaka 567-0047
Japan

Florida International University (FIU) - Department of Economics ( email )

Miami, FL 33199
United States

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