Repeated Proximity Games

Posted: 13 Jan 1999

See all articles by Jerome Renault

Jerome Renault

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Tristan Tomala

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Abstract

We consider repeated games with complete information and imperfect monitoring, where each player is assigned a fixed subset of players and only observes the moves chosen by the players in this subset. This structure is naturally represented by a directed graph. We prove that a generalized folk theorem holds for any payoff function if and only if the graph is 2-connected, and then extend this result to the context of finitely repeated games.

JEL Classification: C73

Suggested Citation

Renault, Jerome and Tomala, Tristan, Repeated Proximity Games. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=143230

Jerome Renault (Contact Author)

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

12, place du Panthéon
Paris, IL
France

Tristan Tomala

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

12, place du Panthéon
Paris, IL
France

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