Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis

45 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2009

See all articles by Axel Dreher

Axel Dreher

Heidelberg University

Justina A. V. Fischer

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD); Stockholm School of Economics; University of Hohenheim

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2009

Abstract

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of transnational terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact. These results are robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.

Keywords: terrorism, decentralization, federalism, governance quality, government effectiveness

JEL Classification: D74, H70, H40

Suggested Citation

Dreher, Axel and Fischer, Justina A.V., Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis (July 2009). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2699, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1433671 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1433671

Axel Dreher (Contact Author)

Heidelberg University ( email )

Grabengasse 1
Heidelberg, 69117
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.axel-dreher.de

Justina A.V. Fischer

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) ( email )

2 rue Andre Pascal
Paris Cedex 16, 75775
France

Stockholm School of Economics

PO Box 6501
Stockholm, 11383
Sweden

University of Hohenheim

Fruwirthstr. 48
Stuttgart, 70599
Germany

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