Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect

13 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2009

See all articles by Assaf Razin

Assaf Razin

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Edith Sand

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2009

Abstract

The pay-as-you-go social security system, burdened by dwindling labour force, can benefit from immigrants, with birth rates that exceed the native-born birth rates. Thus, the social security system effectively provides an incentive to liberalize migration policy through a political-economy mechanism. The paper examines a dynamic political-economy mechanism through which the social security system influences the young decisive voter's attitudes in favour of a more liberal immigration regime. A Markov equilibrium with social security consists of a more liberal migration policy, than a corresponding equilibrium with no social security.

Keywords: Demographic Imbalance, Pay-As-You-Go Social Security System, Repeated Voting

JEL Classification: F22, H55, J11, P16

Suggested Citation

Razin, Assaf and Sand, Edith, Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect (June 2009). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7310. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1433906

Assaf Razin (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 640 7303 (Phone)
+972 3 640 9908 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Edith Sand

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

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