The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures
15 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2009
There are 2 versions of this paper
The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures
Date Written: June 2009
Abstract
We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously.
Keywords: adverse selection, Hidden information, information gathering
JEL Classification: C72, D82, D86
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
Simple Contracts, Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information, and the Hold-Up Problem
-
Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages
-
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions
-
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions
-
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems
-
The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory
-
Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information
-
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach
-
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach