Why Weak Patents? Rational Ignorance or Pro-'Customer' Tilt?

61 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2009

See all articles by Zhen Lei

Zhen Lei

Pennsylvania State University

Brian D. Wright

University of California, Berkeley

Date Written: July, 14 2009


The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) grants many weak patents that would be ruled invalid if subjected to more thorough scrutiny. Some observers see weak patents as evidence of the need for allocation of more resources to increase the accuracy of patent examinations. Others argue that the costs of such reform would outweigh the benefits; weak patents reveal the “rational ignorance” of the Patent Office; it is optimal to leave examiners unequipped to identify more weak applications, deferring the large costs of more definitive determination of validity until patents are litigated. Here we address the assumption underlying both positions: that examiners cannot distinguish weak patents from strong. We find that US examiners’ prior art searches reveal that they can and do identify many patents that are of dubious validity. They conduct a more intensive search for prior art for applications they accurately identify as weak, because they bear the burden of proof of non-patentability, but not of patentability. Our study suggests that the rules and procedures of the USPTO have forced examiners to grant many of these weak applications. Given the resources at hand, examiners possess information about the validity of their patents that society does not use. We do not find the balance of the marginal costs and benefits of information about patent validity that would characterize rational ignorance at the USPTO.

Keywords: patents, intellectual property, innovation

JEL Classification: O31, O34, O38

Suggested Citation

Lei, Zhen and Wright, Brian D., Why Weak Patents? Rational Ignorance or Pro-'Customer' Tilt? (July, 14 2009). CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1434275 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1434275

Zhen Lei

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park
State College, PA 16802
United States

Brian D. Wright (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics