Medical Licensing Board Characteristics and Physician Discipline: An Empirical Analysis

41 Pages Posted: 21 Jul 2009 Last revised: 14 Nov 2024

See all articles by Marc T. Law

Marc T. Law

University of Vermont - Department of Economics

Zeynep K. Hansen

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: July 2009

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between the characteristics of medical licensing boards and the frequency with which boards discipline physicians. Specifically, we take advantage of variation in the structure of medical licensing boards between 1993 and 2003 to determine the effect of organizational and budgetary independence, public oversight, and resource constraints on rates of physician discipline. We find that larger licensing boards, boards with more staff, and boards that are organizationally independent from state government discipline doctors more frequently. Public oversight and political control over board budgets do not appear to influence the extent to which medical licensing boards discipline doctors. These findings are broadly consistent with theories of regulatory behavior that emphasize the importance of bureaucratic autonomy for effective regulatory enforcement.

Suggested Citation

Law, Marc T. and Hansen, Zeynep Kocabiyik, Medical Licensing Board Characteristics and Physician Discipline: An Empirical Analysis (July 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w15140, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1434654

Marc T. Law

University of Vermont - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/mtlaw

Zeynep Kocabiyik Hansen (Contact Author)

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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