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Doctors as Bankers: Evidence from Fertility Markets

Jim Hawkins

University of Houston Law Center

July 29, 2009

Tulane Law Review, Vol. 84, p. 841, 2010
CLEA 2009 Annual Meeting Paper

In a variety of medical contexts, doctors play a prominent role as bankers, lending directly to patients or arranging for patients to obtain loans from third party lenders. This Article offers evidence of this activity from fertility markets based on an empirical study of virtually every fertility clinics’ website in the United States and on interviews with key market participants. I find that doctors play an important role in patients’ decisions about credit, discussing credit with patients and even recommending and promoting specific lenders to patients while excluding consideration of other potential lenders.

Despite the prevalence of this conduct, the law does not generally regulate doctors as bankers. Patients are largely left unprotected by current regulations, but they face significant problems when doctors act as bankers. Patients, vulnerable to their physicians’ suggestions, often uncritically accept financial advice from their doctor. Instead of shopping for the best loan, they take the loan their doctor selects for them. But, doctors face a conflict of interest when choosing which lender to recommend because different lenders charge physicians different amounts when patients pay with loans. Also, patients are often left confused when doctors present piecemeal information about lenders, and patients end up taking out loans with unfavorable terms.

In light of these problems, I offer a potential regulatory framework to regulate doctors acting as bankers. I suggest that regulations should require doctors to disclose the basic loan information that the Truth in Lending Act currently requires that lenders disclose. Moreover, policymakers should require physicians to disclose the financial arrangement between themselves and the lenders they recommend and, if they recommend lenders, to recommend at least three potential lenders to patients to encourage price shopping.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 58

Keywords: consumer finance, behavioral law and economics, fertility markets, consumer protection

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Date posted: July 18, 2009 ; Last revised: March 20, 2010

Suggested Citation

Hawkins, Jim, Doctors as Bankers: Evidence from Fertility Markets (July 29, 2009). Tulane Law Review, Vol. 84, p. 841, 2010; CLEA 2009 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1435610

Contact Information

Jim Hawkins (Contact Author)
University of Houston Law Center ( email )
4604 Calhoun Road
Houston, TX 77204-6060
United States

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