An Administrable and Efficient Legal Standard for Refusals to Deal and Price Squeezes by an Unregulated, Vertically Integrated Monopolist

43 Pages Posted: 20 Jul 2009 Last revised: 29 Jul 2009

See all articles by Steven C. Salop

Steven C. Salop

Georgetown University Law Center

Date Written: July 19, 2009

Abstract

This paper formulates a rigorous rule of reason legal standard under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for refusals to deal and price squeezes undertaken by an unregulated, vertically integrated monopolist against actual or potential competitors. This rule of reason standard is administrable by the courts and the monopolist. It takes into account the direct effects on consumers, as well as the longer run effects on the innovation and investment incentives of both the monopolist and its would-be competitors. In this way, the legal standard protects consumers and the competitive process on which a successful market economy is based.

Keywords: antitrust, refusals to deal, sherman act

Suggested Citation

Salop, Steven C., An Administrable and Efficient Legal Standard for Refusals to Deal and Price Squeezes by an Unregulated, Vertically Integrated Monopolist (July 19, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1436481 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1436481

Steven C. Salop (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
202-662-9095 (Phone)
202-662-9497 (Fax)

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