3 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2009
Date Written: July 20, 2009
This written testimony accompanied Professor J.W. Verret's oral testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services. This testimony argues that executive compensation proposals by the Administration will not address any systemic risk posed by large financial institutions. It also argues that quarterly earnings guidance is a more useful target to limit systemic risk than executive compensation practices at financial firms.
Keywords: Bank of America, bailout, Barney Frank, Christopher Cox, Deutsche Bank, Federal Reserve Board, Mary Schapiro, Obama, SEC, Say on Pay, Securities and Exchange Commission, Spencer Bachus, TARP, Wall Street
JEL Classification: G24, G28, G38
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Verret, J. W., Unintended Consequences of Executive Compensation Regulation Threatens to Worsen the Financial Crisis (July 20, 2009). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 09-34. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1436658 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1436658