Redistricting and Polarization: Who Draws the Lines in California?

Posted: 24 Jul 2009  

Corbett A. Grainger

University of Wisconsin - Madison

Date Written: July, 24 2009

Abstract

In the U.S., the process of drawing election districts is left to individual states, and critics of legislative redistricting often argue for independent panels to take control of the process. A common claim is that legislative redistricting has been a major contributor to polarization in the American political system; however, there have been few tests of this hypothesis. Previous attempts to test for a relationship between redistricting and polarization have generally relied on cross-state comparisons in redistricting methods and examining behavior in the House of Representatives. In this paper, I exploit the fact that the redistricting process in California has alternated between legislatively-drawn and panel-drawn districts since the mid-1960s. Using data at the state legislature level, I find evidence that legislatively-drawn districts have been, on average, less competitive than panel-drawn districts. Moreover, as districts become "safer" legislators tend to take more extreme voting positions. Finally, I find evidence that legislative redistricting (compared with panel-drawn redistricting) is associated with increased polarization.

Keywords: redistricting, polarization, gerrymandering, legislative behavior, political economy of legislative processes

JEL Classification: D70, D72, D79

Suggested Citation

Grainger, Corbett A., Redistricting and Polarization: Who Draws the Lines in California? (July, 24 2009). Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 53, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1438643

Corbett Alden Grainger (Contact Author)

University of Wisconsin - Madison ( email )

427 Lorch St.
Madison, WI 53706-1503
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.aae.wisc.edu/cagrainger

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