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Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming

Charles A Dice Center Working Paper No. 2009-13

Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2009-03-13

Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 09-27

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 256/2009

43 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2009 Last revised: 27 Sep 2010

See all articles by Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

René M. Stulz

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 12, 2010

Abstract

We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no evidence that they performed better. Banks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of compensation in cash bonuses for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. Bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis. Consequently, they suffered extremely large wealth losses in the wake of the crisis.

Keywords: Financial crisis, CEO compensation, CEO incentives, Insider trading

JEL Classification: G01, G21, G32

Suggested Citation

Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger and Stulz, Rene M., Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis (August 12, 2010). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming, Charles A Dice Center Working Paper No. 2009-13, Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2009-03-13, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 09-27, ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 256/2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1439859 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1439859

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach (Contact Author)

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne ( email )

Quartier UNIL-Dorigny
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1015 Lausanne, CH-1015
Switzerland
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HOME PAGE: http://https://www.epfl.ch/labs/sfi-rf/

Swiss Finance Institute

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Rene M. Stulz

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )

2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/faculty/stulz

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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