The United States’ Higher Education Antitrust Exemption and College Enrollment

31 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2009 Last revised: 30 Oct 2009

See all articles by John A. Karikari

John A. Karikari

US Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Hashem Dezhbakhsh

Emory University - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 28, 2009

Abstract

This study examines the effect of the higher education antitrust exemption on enrollment of financial aid applicants at highly selective private colleges that implemented the exemption. The antitrust exemption, used since the 2002-03 academic year, was made permanent in May 2008 by the U.S. Congress, allowing colleges with need-blind admission policy to use common standards without discussing or comparing individual awards. Our findings suggest that the likelihood of enrollment at the colleges implementing the antitrust exemption increased compared to those that did not. Concerns about the adverse effect of the exemption on enrollment, therefore, seems to be unwarranted. Moreover, the common standards do not seem to increase college access for low income students.

Keywords: Higher Education Antitrust Exempt, Financial Aid, College Enrollment, 568 Presidents’ Group

JEL Classification: K21, I21, I28

Suggested Citation

Karikari, John A. and Dezhbakhsh, Hashem, The United States’ Higher Education Antitrust Exemption and College Enrollment (October 28, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1440306 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1440306

John A. Karikari (Contact Author)

US Government Accountability Office (GAO) ( email )

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Hashem Dezhbakhsh

Emory University - Department of Economics ( email )

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