Concentration in Corporate Bank Loans - What Do We Learn from European Comparisons?
21 Pages Posted: 29 Jul 2009
Date Written: February 29, 2009
The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the determinants of creditor concentration in the use of bank loans by firms in a European cross-country framework. We analyze the influence of loan and borrower characteristics but also banking market structure and legal enforcement variables that are expected to influence the financial and strategic decisions relative to bank lending concentration. We find that firms tend to diversify sources of financing by reducing bank concentration when their level of quality is higher and both asymmetric information and the risk of early liquidation are minimal (larger, older, transparent, liquid and profitable firms). Furthermore, lenders’ monitoring appears to be an important feature of lending concentration, particularly in order to prevent private benefits extraction by insiders in legal environment where shareholders benefit from better protections.
Keywords: Financial intermediation, bank lending, creditor concentration, information asymmetry, agency costs, Europe
JEL Classification: G21, G32, G33
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation