Lobbying of Firms by Voters

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 09-068/1

29 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2009

See all articles by Matthias Dahm

Matthias Dahm

University of Nottingham; Universitat Rovira i Virgili - Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials

Robert Dur

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Amihai Glazer

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 31, 2009

Abstract

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible.

Keywords: Lobbying, voting, special interests, influence

JEL Classification: C72, D72, D78

Suggested Citation

Dahm, Matthias and Dur, Robert and Glazer, Amihai, Lobbying of Firms by Voters (July 31, 2009). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 09-068/1. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1441846 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1441846

Matthias Dahm (Contact Author)

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

Universitat Rovira i Virgili - Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials ( email )

Department of Economics
Av. de la Universitat 1
43204 Reus
Spain
+34977 759 850 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://gandalf.fcee.urv.es/professors/MatthiasDahm/

Robert Dur

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )

FEW / H 8-15
P.O. Box 1738
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
+31-10-4082159 (Phone)
+31-10-4089161 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.few.eur.nl/dur

Tinbergen Institute

Amsterdam/Rotterdam
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Amihai Glazer

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics ( email )

3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
United States
949-854-6563 (Phone)
949-824-2182 (Fax)

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