Licensing Policy and Technology Adoption in Standard Setting Organizations

29 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2009 Last revised: 13 Jun 2014

See all articles by Emanuele Tarantino

Emanuele Tarantino

Luiss Guido Carli University; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 5, 2014

Abstract

I analyze standard setting organizations' decisions on licensing policy and standard's technological specification, and the ensuing implications for social welfare. I find the conditions under which a licensing rule that grants monopoly power to the licensors whose technology is adopted in the standard can be employed by the members of the consortium (ex-post licensing). Moreover, I show that the adoption of ex-post licensing might lead to the inefficient exclusion of an efficient stand-alone licensor. Finally, I discuss the conditions under which a policy of ex-ante licensing can be less efficient than ex-post licensing.

Keywords: Technology Standards, Vertical Integration, Licensing Agreements, Cross-licensing, Exclusion.

JEL Classification: K21, L15, L24, L42

Suggested Citation

Tarantino, Emanuele, Licensing Policy and Technology Adoption in Standard Setting Organizations (March 5, 2014). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2011-003, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1442503 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1442503

Emanuele Tarantino (Contact Author)

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

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