Property Rights Institutions and Firm Performance: A Cross-Country Analysis

Posted: 5 Aug 2009 Last revised: 21 May 2012

See all articles by Mahmut Yasar

Mahmut Yasar

University of Texas at Arlington - Department of Economics; Emory University - Department of Economics

Catherine J. Morrison Paul

University of California, Davis - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Hartford - Barney School of Business

Michael R. Ward

University of Texas at Arlington - College of Business Administration - Department of Economics; ZEW, Mannheim

Date Written: June 1, 2009

Abstract

This paper empirically examines the link between firms’ performance and institutional quality using data for firms in 52 countries. We control for potential endogeneity by instruments alternatively based on legal origin and “related-firm” institutions, and by a “bribery” variable. We also use two indicators of institutional quality: firms’ expectations that their contractual and property rights will be protected by the legal system, and a property rights index from The Heritage Foundation. We incorporate firm-specific characteristics including industry type and international linkages. We find significantly positive relationships between firms’ performance and perceived property rights protection independent of other observable firm characteristics. .

Keywords: legal enforcement; property rights, institutions; firm performance; productivity, cross-country analysis

JEL Classification: D73, K42, M14, D24, L25, O12

Suggested Citation

Yasar, Mahmut and Morrison Paul, Catherine J. and Ward, Michael Robert, Property Rights Institutions and Firm Performance: A Cross-Country Analysis (June 1, 2009). World Development, Volume 39, Issue 4, April 2011, Pages 648–661, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1443255

Mahmut Yasar (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Arlington - Department of Economics ( email )

701 S. West Street
Arlington, TX 76019
United States

Emory University - Department of Economics ( email )

Catherine J. Morrison Paul

University of California, Davis - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics ( email )

One Shields Avenue
Davis, CA 95616
United States
916-752-0469 (Phone)
916-752-5614 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

University of Hartford - Barney School of Business

200 Bloomfield Ave
West Hartford, CT 06117
United States

Michael Robert Ward

University of Texas at Arlington - College of Business Administration - Department of Economics ( email )

330 Business Building
Box 19479
Arlington, TX 76019
United States
817-272-3090 (Phone)
817-272-3145 (Fax)

ZEW, Mannheim ( email )

D-68034 Mannheim
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
1,041
PlumX Metrics