Financial Tunneling and the Mandatory Bid Rule

European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 10, pp. 233-253, 2009

Posted: 7 Aug 2009 Last revised: 28 Jun 2011

See all articles by Jeremy Grant

Jeremy Grant

London School of Economics

Tom Kirchmaier

London School of Economics - Centre for Economic Performance; Copenhagen Business School

Jodie A. Kirshner

University of Cambridge

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

In this paper we use clinical studies to document how dominant shareholders have circumvented mandatory bid rules to appropriate wealth from minority shareholders. Dominant shareholders are numerous in continental Europe. Creative compliance with mandatory bid rules reveals the failure of boards and regulators to protect minority shareholders and the difficulties of legislating in this area. We propose enhanced means for protecting their interests.

Suggested Citation

Grant, Jeremy and Kirchmaier, Tom and Kirshner, Jodie A., Financial Tunneling and the Mandatory Bid Rule (2009). European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 10, pp. 233-253, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1443385

Jeremy Grant

London School of Economics ( email )

Houghton St
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Tom Kirchmaier (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Centre for Economic Performance ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 207 955 6854 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/tomkirchmaier/home

Copenhagen Business School ( email )

Porcelænshaven 24A, 3rd floor
Copenhagen
Denmark

Jodie A. Kirshner

University of Cambridge ( email )

Cambridge, CB3 0DS
United Kingdom

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