Ownership and Managerial Competition: Employee, Customer, or Outside Ownership

Posted: 7 Jan 1999

See all articles by Patrick Bolton

Patrick Bolton

Columbia Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Chenggang Xu

University of Hong Kong

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 1998

Abstract

It is widely accepted that only the protection of private property rights and competition by rival firms provide adequate incentives to perform for managers and employees. However, it is not entirely clear how ownership interacts with competition. This paper centres around the question of ownership of firms and managerial competition and how these affect managers and employees' incentives to invest in human capital.

JEL Classification: G31, G32

Suggested Citation

Bolton, Patrick and Xu, Chenggang, Ownership and Managerial Competition: Employee, Customer, or Outside Ownership (June 1998). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=144369

Patrick Bolton (Contact Author)

Columbia Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pbolton/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Chenggang Xu

University of Hong Kong ( email )

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Hong Kong, Pokfulam HK
China

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