The International Labor Organization in the Stag Hunt for Global Labor Rights

Journal of Law and Ethics of Human Rights, Forthcoming

Rutgers School of Law-Newark Research Papers No. 048

28 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2009  

Alan Hyde

Rutgers University - School of Law

Date Written: August 4, 2009

Abstract

The International Labor Organization (ILO) is not an effective force for raising labor standards in the developing world and could become considerably more effective by taking account of the two of the most important and interrelated recent theoretical developments in understanding labor standards. First, countries derive no comparative advantage in the global trading system from most very low labor standards. The ILO should therefore concentrate its energies on lifting these, rather than (as it so often does) concentrating on labor standards that are a source of comparative advantage, the elimination of which is resisted strongly and effectively. Second, the tools of game theory may be used to identify the collective action problems that prevent countries from lifting their own labor standards, and create a role for a transnational agency that may assist them.

Keywords: labor rights, Stag Hunt Model, game theory, globalization

Suggested Citation

Hyde, Alan, The International Labor Organization in the Stag Hunt for Global Labor Rights (August 4, 2009). Journal of Law and Ethics of Human Rights, Forthcoming; Rutgers School of Law-Newark Research Papers No. 048. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1443978

Alan Stuart Hyde (Contact Author)

Rutgers University - School of Law ( email )

NJ
United States
973-353-3163 (Phone)
973-353-1445 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~hyde

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