Accountability and Independence of International Election Observers

Published in: 6 International Organizations Law Review (2009), pp. 541-580.

U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2009-05

41 Pages Posted: 6 Aug 2009 Last revised: 18 Jul 2014

See all articles by Anne van Aaken

Anne van Aaken

University of Hamburg, Law School; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Richard Chambers

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: August 1, 2009

Abstract

International Election Monitoring has become ever more important in the national as well as the international context. Plenty of (regional) International Organizations (and NGOs) send Election Observers Missions (EOMs) to countries in order to assess the quality of their democratic process and elections. Whereas the influence of EOMs is largely undisputed, their independence, impartiality and accountability have been less discussed. This paper describes the legal set-up of EOMs in order to assess their independence. It also uses accountability mechanisms as discussed in international law scholarship (ILA Report and the Global Administrative Law project) in order to analyze the accountability mechanisms currently in place for EOMs.

Keywords: International Election Monitoring, Election Observers Missions, democratic elections

JEL Classification: F19, H11, H7, K33, F53, F55, D72

Suggested Citation

van Aaken, Anne and Chambers, Richard, Accountability and Independence of International Election Observers (August 1, 2009). Published in: 6 International Organizations Law Review (2009), pp. 541-580.; U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2009-05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1444249

Anne Van Aaken (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg, Law School ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Richard Chambers

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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