Short-Term Deviations from Simple Majority Voting

CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Working Paper No.09/115

25 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2009

See all articles by Theresa Fahrenberger

Theresa Fahrenberger

Heidelberg University - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics

Date Written: July 2009

Abstract

I discuss instances where a committee wants to deviate from the simple majority rule by adopting an alternative voting scheme for two consecutive binary ballots. The alternative voting rule, called Minority Voting as an Exception (MVE), works as follows: In the first ballot a b-majority rule is used, where b< 1/2 is equal to the minority fraction that favors some project, say project 1. This allows the minority to induce the adoption of project 1. After the first ballot all voting winners, i.e. the minority of project winners, lose their voting rights for the upcoming second ballot, where the simple majority rule is used. Hence, MVE may benefit both project losers and winners and may thus be unanimously accepted. The analysis of this short-term deviation is presented with a potential application in the sphere of communal politics.

Keywords: voting, minority, communal politics

JEL Classification: D7

Suggested Citation

Fahrenberger, Theresa, Short-Term Deviations from Simple Majority Voting (July 2009). CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Working Paper No.09/115. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1444344 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1444344

Theresa Fahrenberger (Contact Author)

Heidelberg University - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics ( email )

Grabengasse 14
Heidelberg, D-69117
Germany

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