The Misdirection of Current Corporate Governance Proposals

6 Pages Posted: 6 Aug 2009  

J. W. Verret

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: August 6, 2009

Abstract

This written testimony accompanied Professor J.W. Verret's oral testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Development. This testimony argues that corporate governance reforms under consideration in the Senate, including the Shareholder Bill of Rights, will work to limit shareholder choice in corporate elections and risk undermining the role of states in corporate governance.

Keywords: corporate law, executive compensation, Delaware, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, mark-to-market accounting, Proxy Access, SEC, TARP, Wall Street

JEL Classification: G30, G34, G38

Suggested Citation

Verret, J. W., The Misdirection of Current Corporate Governance Proposals (August 6, 2009). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 09-37. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1444858 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1444858

J. W. Verret (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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