Anonymity and Order Submissions

37 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2009 Last revised: 7 Feb 2015

See all articles by Huu Nhan Duong

Huu Nhan Duong

Monash University - Department of Banking and Finance; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Petko S. Kalev

La Trobe Business School

Date Written: August 7, 2009

Abstract

We investigate the effect of the removal of broker identities on institutional and individual order submissions on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). We document declines in order aggressiveness and effective spreads for both institutional and individual investors after the switch to the anonymous trading system. Institutions are more willing to improve the best quotes than individuals, especially in the anonymous market. Anonymity also reduces the “picked off” risk for individual limit orders. Overall, our findings highlight the benefits of withholding brokers’ IDs in the form of lower transaction costs and higher liquidity supply and thus support the ASX’s decision to stop disclosing broker identity information.

Keywords: Anonymity; Institutional investors; Individual investors; Order submissions

JEL Classification: C35, G15, G25, G29

Suggested Citation

Duong, Huu Nhan and Kalev, Petko S., Anonymity and Order Submissions (August 7, 2009). Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 25, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1445311 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1445311

Huu Nhan Duong

Monash University - Department of Banking and Finance ( email )

Melbourne
Australia

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

Petko S. Kalev (Contact Author)

La Trobe Business School ( email )

Department of Economics and Finance
Donald Whitehead Building: Level 3, DWB313
Bundoora, Victoria 3086
Australia
+613 9479 6285 (Phone)
+613 9479 1654 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.latrobe.edu.au/business/about/staff/profile?uname=PKalev

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