Work Disability, Health, and Incentive Effects

26 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2009

See all articles by Axel H. Börsch-Supan

Axel H. Börsch-Supan

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA)

Date Written: May 8, 2007

Abstract

Disability insurance - the insurance against the loss of the ability to work - is a substantial part of social security expenditures in many countries. The enrolment rates in disability insurance vary strikingly across European countries and the US. This paper investigates the extent of, and the causes for, this variation, using data from SHARE, ELSA and HRS.

We show that even after controlling for differences in the demographic structure and health status these differences remain. In turn, indicators of disability insurance generosity explain 75% of the cross-national variation. We conclude that country-specific disability insurance rules are a prime candidate to explain the observed cross-country variation in disability insurance enrolment.

Suggested Citation

Börsch-Supan, Axel H., Work Disability, Health, and Incentive Effects (May 8, 2007). MEA Discussion Paper No. 135-07. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1445367 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1445367

Axel H. Börsch-Supan (Contact Author)

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) ( email )

Amalienstrasse 33
Munich, 80799
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.mea.mpisoc.mpg.de

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