Monetary Union in West Africa: An Agency of Restraint for Fiscal Policies

34 Pages Posted: 11 Aug 2009

See all articles by Paul R. Masson

Paul R. Masson

C.D. Howe Institute

Catherine A. Pattillo

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: March 2001

Abstract

Could a West African monetary union (either of the non-CFA countries, or all ECOWAS members) be an effective "agency of restraint" on fiscal policies? We discuss how monetary union could affect fiscal discipline and the arguments for explicit fiscal restraints considered in the European Monetary Union literature, and their applicability to West Africa. The empirical evidence, EMU literature, and CFA experience suggest that monetary union could create the temptation for fiscal profligacy through prospects of a bailout, or costs diluted through the membership. Thus, a West African monetary union could promote fiscal discipline only if the hands of the fiscal authorities are also tied by a strong set of fiscal restraints.

Keywords: West African Monetary Union, Africa, Fiscal policy, CFA franc, Trade

Suggested Citation

Masson, Paul R. and Pattillo, Catherine A., Monetary Union in West Africa: An Agency of Restraint for Fiscal Policies (March 2001). IMF Working Papers, Vol. , pp. 1-33, 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1445770

Paul R. Masson (Contact Author)

C.D. Howe Institute

67 Yonge St., Suite 300
Toronto, Ontario M5E 1J8
Canada

Catherine A. Pattillo

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

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