Can International Migration Ever Be Made a Pareto Improvement?
25 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2009
Date Written: February 1, 2009
Abstract
We argue that compensating losers is more difficult for immigration than for trade and capital movements. While a tax-cum-subsidy mechanism allows the government to turn the gains from trade into a Pareto improvement, the same is not true for the so-called immigration surplus, if the redistributive mechanism is not allowed to discriminate against migrants. We discuss policy conclusions to be drawn from this fundamental asymmetry between migration and other forms of globalization.
Keywords: Migration Surplus, Redistribution, Pareto Improvement
JEL Classification: F22, H21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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