Can International Migration Ever Be Made a Pareto Improvement?

25 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2009  

Wilhelm Kohler

University of Tuebingen - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Gabriel J. Felbermayr

University of Stuttgart-Hohenheim

Date Written: February 1, 2009

Abstract

We argue that compensating losers is more difficult for immigration than for trade and capital movements. While a tax-cum-subsidy mechanism allows the government to turn the gains from trade into a Pareto improvement, the same is not true for the so-called immigration surplus, if the redistributive mechanism is not allowed to discriminate against migrants. We discuss policy conclusions to be drawn from this fundamental asymmetry between migration and other forms of globalization.

Keywords: Migration Surplus, Redistribution, Pareto Improvement

JEL Classification: F22, H21

Suggested Citation

Kohler, Wilhelm and Felbermayr, Gabriel J., Can International Migration Ever Be Made a Pareto Improvement? (February 1, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1446680 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1446680

Wilhelm K. Kohler (Contact Author)

University of Tuebingen - Department of Economics ( email )

Mohlstrasse 36
D-72074 Tuebingen, 72074
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Gabriel J. Felbermayr

University of Stuttgart-Hohenheim ( email )

Keplerstra├če 17
D-70174 Stuttgart
Germany

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