Strategic Interaction and Interstate Crises: A Bayesian Quantal Response Estimator for Incomplete Information Games

Posted: 18 Aug 2009

See all articles by Justin Esarey

Justin Esarey

Emory University - Department of Political Science

Bumba Mukherjee

University of Notre Dame - Kellogg Institute for International Studies; Princeton University

Will H. Moore

Florida State University - Department of Political Science

Abstract

Private information characteristics like resolve and audience costs are powerful influences over strategic international behavior, especially crisis bargaining. As a consequence, states face asymmetric information when interacting with one another and will presumably try to learn about each others' private characteristics by observing each others' behavior. A satisfying statistical treatment would account for the existence of asymmetric information and model the learning process. This study develops a formal and statistical framework for incomplete information games that we term the Bayesian Quantal Response Equilibrium Model (BQRE model). Our BQRE model offers three advantages over existing work: it directly incorporates asymmetric information into the statistical model's structure, estimates the influence of private information characteristics on behavior, and mimics the temporal learning process that we believe takes place in international politics.

Suggested Citation

Esarey, Justin and Mukherjee, Bumba and Moore, Will H., Strategic Interaction and Interstate Crises: A Bayesian Quantal Response Estimator for Incomplete Information Games. Political Analysis, Vol. 16, Issue 3, pp. 250-273, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1448429 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpm037

Justin Esarey (Contact Author)

Emory University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

HOME PAGE: http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~jesarey/

Bumba Mukherjee

University of Notre Dame - Kellogg Institute for International Studies ( email )

130 Hesburgh Center
Notre Dame, IN 46556
United States
(574) 631-7472 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http:/politicalscience.nd.edu/faculty

Princeton University ( email )

22 Chambers Street
Princeton, NJ 08544-0708
United States

Will H. Moore

Florida State University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Talahasse, FL 30306
United States
850-644-6924 (Phone)

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