One-sided Games in a War of Attrition

22 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2009 Last revised: 9 Feb 2015

Date Written: February 8, 2015


This study develops a war-of-attrition model with the asymmetric feature that one player can be defeated by the other but not vice versa; that is, only one player has an exogenous probability of being forced to capitulate. With complete information, the equilibria are almost identical to the canonical war-of-attrition model. On the other hand, with incomplete information on a player's robustness, a war where both players fight for some duration emerges. Moreover, a player who is never defeated may capitulate in equilibrium, and this player will give in earlier if the other player's fighting costs are greater.

Keywords: war, attrition, Bayesian learning, asymmetric robustness

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Asako, Yasushi, One-sided Games in a War of Attrition (February 8, 2015). APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN:

Yasushi Asako (Contact Author)

Waseda University ( email )

1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda
Tokyo, Tokyo 169-8050


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