Suicide Terrorism and the Weakest Link

32 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2009 Last revised: 4 Sep 2009

See all articles by Brian Roberson

Brian Roberson

Purdue University - Department of Economics

Dan Kovenock

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Daniel G. Arce

University of Texas at Dallas - Department of Economics & Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

In this paper we examine a model of terrorism which focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize either or both suicide and conventional terrorism tactics. The terrorist organization’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize suicide attacks when other modes of attack are available, and the optimal anti-terrorism measures.

Suggested Citation

Roberson, Brian and Kovenock, Daniel and Arce, Daniel G., Suicide Terrorism and the Weakest Link (2009). APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1449856

Brian Roberson (Contact Author)

Purdue University - Department of Economics ( email )

West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

Daniel Kovenock

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

1 University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Daniel G. Arce

University of Texas at Dallas - Department of Economics & Finance ( email )

Richardson, TX 75083
United States

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