Voting and Sincerity - Ideal Point Drift and Strategy in a Regulatory Board

19 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2009 Last revised: 18 Sep 2009

See all articles by Eric Magar

Eric Magar

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department

Guillermo Rosas

Washington University in St. Louis

Federico Estévez

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

We use a dynamic item response theory model (Martin and Quinn 2002) to investigate ideal point stability in Mexico's IFE, an election regulatory board. Results indicate that stability is not predominant, that most board members moved considerably a good deal of the time. We discuss how theories of representation view movement and show that some of the drift we detected is in fact associated with systematic factors. Evidence suggests that movement and strategic considerations associated with representation correlate, contradicting the standard assumption of sincere voting.

Keywords: ideal point estimation, strategic voting, MCMC simulation

JEL Classification: D71, D72, D73

Suggested Citation

Magar, Eric and Rosas, Guillermo and Estévez, Federico, Voting and Sincerity - Ideal Point Drift and Strategy in a Regulatory Board (2009). APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1450034

Eric Magar (Contact Author)

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department ( email )

Rio Hondo 1
Col. Tizapan San-Angel
Mexico City, D.F. 01000
Mexico
525556284079 (Phone)
525554904674 (Fax)

Guillermo Rosas

Washington University in St. Louis ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1208
Saint Louis, MO MO 63130-4899
United States

Federico Estévez

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) ( email )

Av. Camino a Sta. Teresa 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Mexico City, D.F. 01000, Federal District 01080
Mexico

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