Partisan Ambition and Scapegoat Theory: U.S.-China Relations in Political Perspective

Abstract

In this paper, we show that leaders frequently use foreign policy to solve domestic problems, but they do so in ways that traditional diversionary war or scapegoat theories of international politics do not predict. In contrast to scapegoat theory, which assumes that leaders use foreign crises and threats to rally and unify their publics, we argue that leaders use foreign policy to divide and segment domestic opinion. Moreover, we show that often it is the party-out-of-power, not the party-in-power, that manipulates foreign crises and threats for electoral gain. We develop this argument through an analysis of three cases involving U.S. foreign policy toward China. In each case, leaders of the party-out-of-power used China as a “wedge issue” to divide and weaken the party-in-power – sometimes at considerable cost to America’s geopolitical interests and domestic civil liberties. We discuss the implications of these cases for theorizing about domestic politics and foreign policy-making.