32 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2009 Last revised: 2 Sep 2009
Date Written: 2009
A growing empirical research literature examines the role of presidential appointees in institutional and administrative politics. Using a new dataset spanning two decades of Senate-confirmed agency appointments (1989-2009), we analyze two dimensions of appointee politics: the length of time to confirm agency appointees and the duration of appointee service. We develop empirical models demonstrating the influence of appointee position characteristics; types of policies and issue areas; agency professionalism and appointee penetration; congressional oversight; and presidential power on appointee confirmation and tenure. The analysis yields important insight contributing at once to scholarship on the inter-institutional politics of agency administration, as well as to developing knowledge about the consequences of current arrangements for the continuity and, by extension, the effectiveness of agency leadership.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Dull, Matthew M. and Roberts, Patrick and Choi, Sang Ok and Keeney, Michael, Appointee Confirmation and Tenure: Politics, Policy, and Professionalism in Federal Agency Leadership, 1989-2009 (2009). APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1450719