Political and Managerial Succession and the Performance of English Local Governments

27 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2009 Last revised: 4 Sep 2009

See all articles by George Boyne

George Boyne

Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School

Rhys Andrews

Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

Corporate capacity is arguably a key determinant of the success or failure of public sector organizations. However, while there is growing evidence on the extent of corporate capacity, few researchers have systematically examined whether it is linked to public service performance. Does a larger corporate centre lead to better or worse performance for the organization as a whole? To answer this question we apply seemingly unrelated regression to measures of effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and equity in English local government. We find that the effect of corporate capacity on performance is nonlinear, following an inverted u-shaped pattern, and that its positive effect turns negative around the mean for effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, and above the mean for equity. The study therefore suggests that senior managers face important trade-offs between organizational goals when deciding on the appropriate level of corporate capacity.

Suggested Citation

Boyne, George and Andrews, Rhys, Political and Managerial Succession and the Performance of English Local Governments (2009). APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1450736

George Boyne (Contact Author)

Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School ( email )

Aberconway Building
Colum Drive
Cardiff, CF10 3EU
United Kingdom
+ 44 (0) 29 20 875572 (Phone)
+ 44 (0)29 20874419 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cf.ac.uk/carbs/hrm/boyne.html

Rhys Andrews

Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School ( email )

Aberconway Building
Colum Road
Cardiff, Wales CF10 3EU
United Kingdom
+44 (0)29 2087 6014 (Phone)
+44 (0)29 2087 6014 (Fax)

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