Patterns of Local Public Administration Reform: Perceived Effects and Determinants of Contracting and Intermunicipal Cooperation among Local Governments in Sweden

36 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2009 Last revised: 22 Sep 2009

See all articles by Anders Sundell

Anders Sundell

University of Gothenburg - Department of Political Science, Quality of Government Institute

Mikael Gilljam

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Victor Lapuente

University of Gothenburg - Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

Local governments are no longer restricted to in-house production of public services. Contracting out and intermunicipal cooperation have proven to be two viable alternatives, and have gained widespread recognition in practice as well as in scholarly literature. In this paper, we first analyze how local politicians perceive the effects of the reforms. Thereafter, we investigate the determinants of contracting and intermunicipal cooperation among all local governments in Sweden. Politicians tend to perceive both reforms as having beneficial effects; however, further analysis shows that intermunicipal cooperation may impair accountability. When it comes to determinants of actual implementation of the two reforms, we find that factors established in earlier research matter. We also present a hitherto understudied causal mechanism for administrative reform – political uncertainty and resulting policy insulation.

Keywords: Local government, public administration, privatization, contracting, intermunicipal cooperation

Suggested Citation

Sundell, Anders and Gilljam, Mikael and Lapuente, Victor, Patterns of Local Public Administration Reform: Perceived Effects and Determinants of Contracting and Intermunicipal Cooperation among Local Governments in Sweden (2009). APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1450748

Anders Sundell (Contact Author)

University of Gothenburg - Department of Political Science, Quality of Government Institute ( email )

Box 711
Göteborg, S-405 30
Sweden

Mikael Gilljam

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Victor Lapuente

University of Gothenburg - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 711
Göteborg, S-405 30
Sweden

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